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MANAGED CARE AND MANAGED SENTENCINGA Tale of Two Systems

T

he daily injustices mount. The front line
professionals who administer the system cry
out for more discretion to depart from the
rigid rules that bind them. Congress finally hears
their call, and is poised to enact sweeping reforms.
Are improvements in federal sentencing law on
the way? Probably not in the near future. But the
new Congress will surely take up proposals to regulate
the managed health care industry, and the impending
debate over a proposed "Patients' Bill of Rights" law
offers important lessons for federal sentencing policy.
At first blush, sentencing reform and health care
reform have about as much to do with each other as
Justice Breyer and Dr. Spock. But take a closer look
and some interesting if imperfect parallels become
apparent:
• The sentencing and health care systems deliver two
of the most highly valued goods in American life:
justice and medicine. Courtrooms and emergency
rooms dominate the headlines, the congressional
agenda, and even prime time television.
• Both systems are administered by highly educated
professionals. Judges and doctors are prized for the
wisdom and discernment that years of experience
provide, although members of both professions are
sometimes perceived as unaccountable.
• Both justice and health are theoretically available to
all and unwarranted disparity among similarly
culpable defendants or similarly symptomatic
patients is an evil both systems strive to avoid. As a
practical matter, however, the instruments of
punishment (prisons, probation officers) and of
health care (pharmaceuticals, hospitals) are finite
and expensive commodities. Either explicitly or
implicitly, society rations expenditures on both of
these goods.
• Both the sentencing and health care systems tend
to one individual at a time, but society has a huge
stake in the sentence imposed on each criminal and
the medical care provided to each patient. The
punishment of offenders provides society with
general deterrence and incapacitation of dangerous
individuals in the same way that the treatment of
sick people bolsters public health and contains
infectious diseases. The community benefits when
the fair and effective treatment of one of its
members leads to rehabilitation following either
wrongdoing or sickness, just as it suffers from
recidivism or relapse.

Even the sentencing-related federalism issues
discussed elsewhere in this Issue arise in the health
care system as well. Both systems have a history of
shared federal and non-federal responsibilities, but in
both the federal role is expanding. Medical care for
the indigent, traditionally a local concern, is now
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State health officials, like their law enforcement
counterparts, welcome federal resources but resent
federal interference. They have argued, generally
with success, that the federal government is ill-suited
to administer the health programs it funds. Thus, the
federal government has not usurped state and local
control of health care in the way that it has increasingly done so in criminal justice. When the federal
government mandates Medicaid coverage of a medical
condition, for example, it carries out the policy
through state and local agencies.
One reason why the federal role in health care is
less controversial than the federal role in sentencing
is that health care is still largely - despite the advent
of Medicaid and Medicare - a private sector activity,
while sentencing is a purely governmental function.
Criminal sentences are imposed by government
officials applying a body oflaw. In the case of federal
sentencing, Congress itself (either directly or through
its agent, the Sentencing Commission) writes the
rules which guide judges. In contrast, most health
care decisions in the United States are made by
privately employed physicians acting pursuant to rules
promulgated by private insurance companies.
Congress' role in the health arena is not to rewrite
those rules (although, as we will see, it has sometimes
done that) but rather to regulate the interaction
between insurance companies and doctors in order to
protect the interest of patients.
Still, today's managed care debate poses the same
central question that Congress addressed in 1984
when it restructured the federal sentencing system:
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What is the proper balance between standardized decision
making and individualized outcomes in a system that
seeks to dispense a complex good to a large number of
people in a fair, rational and cost-effective manner
through professional decision makers? Whether the
good is justice or medicine, and whether the decision
makers are judges or doctors, Congress must resolve
the inevitable tension between binding rules and
professional discretion.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 struck a
sensible balance between the competing goals of
standardized sentencing rules and individualized
sentencing. Since then, federal sentencing policy has
swung too far toward standardization and away from
judicial discretion. Yet, even as Congress enacts more
mandatory minimum sentencing laws which thwart
individualized decision making, it moves to regulate
managed care in order to reduce standardization and
enhance the professional discretion of doctors.
Why is Congress heading in one direction on
health care and the opposite direction on sentencing?
Does Uncle Sam's left hand not know what his right
hand is doing? Does the American Medical Association have more lobbying clout than the Federal Judges
Association? Or is it just that every patient in the
country is some Congressperson's valued constituent
while criminal defendants are a despised minority?
All of the above. But for a naively logical moment,
let's examine the manner in which Congress is likely
to strike a balance between standardization and
individualization in the health care system in order to
illustrate how it should restore that balance in the
sentencing system.
I. The Evolution of Managed Care

The history of federal sentencing reform is well
known to FSR readers but a brief review of the history
of managed care may be useful to set the stage for a
comparison of the parallel policy debates.
Most Americans obtain health insurance through
their employers, and large corporations typically
subsidize the purchase of health insurance as a
standard employment benefit. Until recently, most
health insurance plans operated on a straightforward
fee-for-service basis: the employee and his or her
family members utilized doctors of their choice, paid
for services out-of-pocket and then submitted receipts
to the employer's insurance company for reimbursement. Insurers engaged in very little cost containment; they made money simply because at any given
moment they covered more young, healthy policy
holders than old, unhealthy ones.
Some employers, especially in the public sector,
offered their employees a choice between fee-forservice insurance and managed care. Under the
managed care option, employees received services
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only from "preferred providers" or were enrolled in a
health maintenance organization (HMO) and
required to utilize doctors employed by the HMO.
Although afforded less freedom to choose their
doctors, employees opting for managed care paid
lower insurance premiums than those in fee-forservice plans and made no out-of-pocket payments
except nominal co-payments at the time of service.
HMOs made money by paying doctors lower fees in
exchange for a guaranteed high volume of patients.
During the 1980's, health care costs grew
dramatically due to a variety of factors, including
expensive new technologies and increased specialization by doctors. Employers scrambled to contain costs
by raising premiums or eliminating altogether the
more expensive fee-for-service option. They also
pressed HMOs to reduce costs by managing health
care benefits more aggressively. HMOs began
reviewing and demanding pre-approval of the treatment decisions of doctors in order to screen out
"unnecessary" health care and thereby save employers
money. Detailed rules were promulgated limiting the
medical services eligible for reimbursement and
constraining the circumstances under which patients
could be referred to specialists.
Doctors naturally chafed under this new regimen
of review. After all, they had traditionally exercised
vast discretion to treat their patients as they saw fit
and were unaccustomed to having their professional
judgment subject to challenge. They saw the
managed care companies as distant, green-eyeshaded,
bean-counting bureaucrats. Also, managed care was
accompanied by complex, burdensome paperwork;
doctors complained that they were so busy complying
with the new rules that they had too little time to
practice medicine. Sounds familiar?
Managed care was almost reformed as part of
President Clinton's ill-fated universal health care
proposal. That plan would have expanded managed
care and used the resulting cost savings to expand
health insurance to all Americans, but it would have
also instituted significant regulation of managed care.
Health plans would have been subject to detailed
quality controls and government oversight, and
patients would have been permitted to appeal the
denial of care to administrative bodies and ultimately
to the courts.
Congress rejected the Clinton plan for reasons
beyond the scope of this article. Since then, economic
forces have caused managed care to expand throughout the health care market, but without comprehensive regulation. Managed care has become more
prevalent, more rigid and more hated by doctors and
patients alike.
Anecdotal evidence of specific managed care
abuses have led legislatures to enact ad hoc patient
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protections. For example, managed care policies
calling for hospitals to discharge newborn children and
their mothers from the hospital within 24 hours after
birth led to an outcry against "drive-by" deliveries. A
number of state legislatures passed laws mandating
that insurance companies pay for no less than 48
hours of hospitalization following childbirth, and
Congress soon included that requirement in federal
law. Other federal statutes mandate coverage for
hospitalization following mastectomies, and prohibit
certain restrictions on insurance coverage for mental
illness that exceed restrictions on coverage for
physical illnesses.
These piecemeal reforms have led to calls for
comprehensive managed care reform, including legal
remedies for patients denied care they contend is
medically necessary. Competing versions of the
Patients' Bill of Rights legislation have surfaced in the
last two years, and there is little doubt the current
Congress will tackle this red-hot issue.
II. Parallels Between Managed Care and "Managed
Sentencing"

Since the movement to reduce doctors' discretion and
standardize health care decision making has come to
be known as "managed care," sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimums might well be called
"managed sentencing."
Although they both blossomed in the 1980's,
"managed care" and "managed sentencing" have
different goals. Insurance companies utilize managed
care to contain costs. The goals of managed sentencing are more complicated - early proponents of a
sentencing guidelines system, such as Senator
Kennedy, believed that the establishment of a body of
sentencing law would help reduce unfair sentencing
disparity, while Republican co-sponsors of the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act saw guidelines (and subsequent mandatory minimums) as a means to lengthen
criminal sentences. Whether the motive is fairness,
crime control, or health care cost containment,
standardization is meant to trump what is perceived to
be the too disparate or lenient exercise of discretion
by professionals "in the field" - judges and doctors.
Advocates of standardized decision making tout
the benefits of simplicity, clarity and (apparent)
certainty. But attempts to impose overly rigid
standards on professional decision making in complex,
fact-bound fields like criminal justice and medicine are
misguided. The effort often fails because sophisticated decision makers are adept at finding ways
around the rules. Thus, mandatory sentencing laws
are not truly mandatory, since prosecutors, judges and
defense attorneys can agree to permit sympathetic
defendants who have committed offenses that carry a
mandatory sentence to plead guilty to lesser or

different offenses that do not carry a mandatory
sentence. Similarly, doctors can evade insurance
rules on behalf of their patients by falsely labeling as
medically necessary procedures that are in fact
elective or cosmetic, or by selecting a diagnosis that
will lead to reimbursement instead of one that will
not.
Still, law and conscience limit the extent to which
judges or doctors will manipulate the rules that
purport to bind them. When those limits are
reached, standardization yields grossly unfair results
in individual cases and frustration results. Judges are
precluded from imposing just sentences, doctors are
precluded from practicing sound medicine, and the
wheels of legislative reform begin to turn.
Managed care reform, as we have seen, will never
go so far as to abolish the rules that insurance
companies impose on physicians. Since there is broad
recognition that cost containment is a legitimate goal,
reformers try to strike a balance between standardization and medical discretion. For example, some
proposals rewrite those rules to make them less
restrictive (e.g., women get to stay in the hospital
longer after giving birth), or they encourage departures from the rules (e.g., doctors are permitted to
advise patients about treatment options outside the
plan's coverage). Patients aggrieved by a decision
under the rules (e.g., refusal to provide an experimental treatment) are afforded the right to appeal that
decision to a higher authority.
Structurally, then, managed care reform
resembles the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act.
Congress established a Sentencing Commission to
write standards, but explicitly permitted judges to
depart from those standards upon a finding of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances not anticipated by the rule makers. Then, to bolster standardization, it permitted either party aggrieved by a
departure to appeal that decision to a higher court.
Unfortunately, the thoughtful sentencing
structure established by the 1984 Act is crumbling
from neglect. Beginning in 1986 and as recently as
last October, Congress has enacted mandatory
minimum sentencing laws that distort the guideline
system and that are the antithesis of balance. An
effort to redress the inflexibility of mandatory
minimums - the 1994 safety valve amendment to 18
U.S.c. 3553 - is itself overly prescriptive and depressingly narrow. The guidelines are less rigid than the
mandatories, but Congress repeatedly undermines
the work of the Commission with overly specific
statutory directives and by blocking Commission
proposals to improve the guidelines. Meanwhile the
Commission itself now has no members as a result of
political wrangling between the Justice Department
and the Senate.
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Federal sentencing today is harsher and more
unthinking than the most heavy-handed managed
care rule ever imposed by an insurance company_ Just
like overly rigid managed care, the sentencing rules
are often evaded; when they cannot be evaded, they
often result in needless pain and suffering_ If the
pre-1984 sentencing system was, as Judge Frankel put
it, law without order, the current system is order
without justice.
III. Lessons

If concern about the excesses of managed care
generates sensible reforms that strike a fair balance
between insurance companies' legitimate need for
standardization and the medical profession's right to
exercise discretion in individual cases, that debate will
have great relevance to the course of federal sentencingpolicy.
One lesson of the managed care debate is easily
applied to sentencing policy: mandatory sentencing
laws are wrong. They should no longer be enacted,
and they should all be repealed. Just as insurance
mandates that arbitrarily cut off medical care without
giving doctors the chance to take account of the
unique needs of individual patients are wrong, so
congressional mandates that impose punishment
without giving judges the chance to take account of
the unique circumstances of individual crimes and
individual criminals are wrong.
A second lesson is directed to the Sentencing
Commission, should its new members ever be
appointed. The current guidelines are too rigid, and
provide for insufficient consideration of offender
characteristics. The mere opportunity to depart from
standards is not enough, for either judge or doctor.
There must be genuine flexibility in the rules
themselves, and a culture of decision making in which
judicious adjustments based on unusual circumstances may occur without stigma or retribution. To
be sure, there should always be an opportunity to
remedy incorrect departures through appeal, but
complex goods like justice or medicine cannot be
dispensed in a mechanistic, cookie cutter fashion.
The lesson of managed care and sentencing
reform is not unique, indeed it is at the heart of our
system of government. Most disputes in our society
pose mixed questions oflaw and fact. All laws passed
by Congress are in some sense standards, yet all are
applied by administrative agencies and judges in
individual cases. Any law so inflexible that it cannot
be applied in a rational manner by wise decision
makers in individual cases should be rewritten.
Mandatory minimums, overly rigid sentencing
guidelines and overly rigid managed care are all flawed
because they pretend that somber and complex
human decisions can be made based on law alone.
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Legislatures, sentencing commissions or insurance
companies that seek to deprive judges or doctors of
the discretion to apply the law or the rules to the facts
of the case have unwisely arrogated too much power
to themselves.
Any decision making model that turns judges or
doctors into mere technicians is especially foolish.
The skill most prized in a judge or a doctor is sound
judgment, and the essence of judgment is differentiating one set of facts from another in order to make a
wise decision. To a distant rule making body two
patients or two criminals may look alike, but the
skilled professional can tell them apart on close
examination. It is no coincidence that doctors are
leaving the practice of medicine and judges are leaving
the bench in the face of twin schemes that deprive
them of the ability to use their judgment.
None of this is to deny that there are sound
reasons for the rise of both managed care and
sentencing guidelines. Medicine is too expensive
these days for doctors to dispense without any
accountability to third party payors. Well regulated
managed care can help constrain health care costs
without unduly compromising the quality of health
care, just as guidelines can lead to more equitable and
understandable sentencing decisions than the lawless
"black-box" process that pre-dated the 1984 Act.
But in the final analysis, only a doctor - not an
insurance company - can treat a sick patient. And
only a judge - not a legislature or an overzealous
commission - can sentence a criminal defendant.
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